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Question 
What works in implementing safeguard policies on infrastructure programming? What are the 
risks associated with exclusion factors more broadly? What lessons can we learn from elsewhere 
on how to strengthen safeguard policies and implementation? (in particular around child labour/ 
exploitation etc.) We are not specifically interested in safeguarding children – we would like to 
draw the lessons from this (more on the implementation side) that address all vulnerable groups 
and the environment.  
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1. Introduction  
DFID’s infrastructure position paper states that ‘improved infrastructure service provision is 
crucial to delivering DFID’s economic and human development objectives’ (DFID 2013) This 
work includes energy, transport, water and sanitation, information communications technology 
(ICT), housing and urban infrastructure (DFID 2015).  Infrastructure is central to achieving 
economic development and providing poor people with opportunities to escape poverty. 
‘Reliable, accessible energy, transport and communication services support increased 
productivity, facilitate trade and create an environment in which business can flourish’ (DFID 
2015). Access to infrastructure enables people to take advantage of economic opportunities and 
access markets, jobs, information and training. However, in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
many hundreds of millions of people still lack access to electricity, transport and water and 
sanitation and inadequate infrastructure is consistently identified as a major barrier to doing 
business (DFID 2015).  DFID’s recent infrastructure aims included: water, sanitation and hygiene 
programmes, building rural roads and providing sustainable energy services.  They do this 
through multiple partners in multiple countries (DFID 2015). 
However, it is also important to consider how these infrastructure policies are implemented and 
ensure that people, the environment and safety issues are considered and protected.  This can 
be done through writing and implementing safeguarding policies.  Safeguarding is an established 
part of the planning process, designed to ensure that land which has been identified for major 
infrastructure projects is protected from conflicting developments (UK Government 2013). Social 
safeguards are defined as the policies in place to ensure that project-affected people are 
consulted about the project throughout the life of the project, from conception through to 
operation and removal, and that these people benefit from the project (World Bank, 2016). This 
definition of social safeguards is underpinned by notions of social justice and researchers have 
conceptualised this as entailing both a procedural and a distributive component (Boström 2012, 
p.5, Nordensvard et al. 2015, p. 247). The procedural component of social justice relates to the 
consultation of those affected by a project, the distributive component to sharing the benefits of 
the project with those affected by it. Discussions on distributive social justice are frequently 
embedded in a broader discourse on equitable development (Kircherr et al 2017). 
The World Bank has 10 safeguard policies covering the following (MPWT 2010): 
 Environmental Assessment 
 Natural Habitats 
 Forests 
 Pest Management 
 Physical Cultural Resources 
 Indigenous Peoples 
 Involuntary Resettlement 
 Safety of Dams 
 Projects on International Waterways 
 Projects in Disputed Areas  
Each of the policies as above have specific objectives, which are to be operationalised through 
specific principles. These have been clearly stated by the World Bank. It is important to note that 
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having policies is not enough, and there needs to be good implementation of these policies 
during the projects, to ensure they are not just rhetoric. 
This report firstly discusses safeguarding issues (section 2).  The report then goes on to discuss 
several infrastructure projects and the recommendations that have come from these to ensure 
good implementation of safeguarding policies (sections 3-8).  The recommendations for good 
implementation are listed at the end of each section.  Section 9 includes additional useful 
resources. 
Much of the literature argues that safeguarding has been taken more seriously in recent years 
and that the root cause for enhanced implementation of safeguarding is social mobilisation. 
Enhanced social safeguard legislation in host countries and funder countries, stricter rules of 
funders and cooperation of developers with international players have also facilitated this 
change. 
The report gives many recommendations but the literature and particularly Kircherr and his team 
(who have worked and published on this issue) includes these two key recommendations to 
strengthen adoption of international social safeguards: 
 Fund environmental NGOs that function as the watchdogs for many private sector 
players 
 Strengthen legislation/enforcement capabilities in host countries 
2. Safeguarding issues 
Safeguarding is a difficult issue for many infrastructure projects.  Kircherr et al (2017) distinguish 
between three different influencers of social safeguards in their recent paper.  These are host 
country norms, funder norms and international norms.  First, host country norms are the norms of 
the country the developers are operating in (codified by the host country government). This type 
of norm overlaps with laws since there is a legal obligation for dam developers to comply with 
them. Host country social safeguard regulations would be an example of such host country 
norms.  
Second, the norms of the country the developer originated in (codified by developer country 
decision-makers). These norms are usually not legally enforceable for activities outside the 
originating country (with several exceptions such as international tax evasion, for instance). An 
example for such norms would be principles on foreign investment published by China's State 
Council. Third, global norms such as the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol 
(HSAP) (codified by international organisations). These international norms are usually non-
binding from a legal perspective with dam developers voluntarily adopting them. 
A prerequisite for the adoption of norms are the capacities of those expected to adopt them. 
What if transnational corporations do not have sufficient capacity to enforce the safeguards to 
which they have committed? Even if these actors were motivated to adopt certain norms, these 
norms may be violated due to lacking capacities; particularly companies with limited experience 
overseas (such as Chinese dam developers in the early 2000s) may be lacking the capacities to 
implement international norms. 
These issues are important to consider when ensuring that policies are implemented as they 
show the motivations and legal enforcement capacity behind safeguarding policies. 
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3. Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar, Laos and 
Cambodia 
Social safeguard norms adopted in Chinese-led projects in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia have 
significantly changed in the past 15 years. Chinese dam developers claimed to adopt host 
country social safeguards upon the launch of China's Going Out Policy. Yet no social safeguard 
legislation was in place in Myanmar and Cambodia in the early 2000s and compliance with 
Laotian social safeguard norms by Chinese dam developers is contested. At times, more 
ambitious Chinese standards would be adopted in Chinese-led dam projects in the early 2000s – 
with various relevant Chinese legislations introduced particularly from the mid-2000s onwards. 
Only in recent years were international norms employed more frequently in Chinese-led dam 
projects.  Kircherr et al conducted interviews and the majority of the interviewees (76%) believed 
that mostly international norms will be adopted in Chinese-led dam projects in Myanmar, Laos 
and Cambodia in the near future (see figure below). 
 
Kircherr et al 2017 then go on to describe some safeguarding issues with their case study 
projects. The Chinese-led projects implemented in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia upon the 
launch of China's Going Out Policy in 2001 largely claimed to adopt the social safeguard norms 
of the host country, according to the interviews they did. This was seen as a reflection of “China's 
promise of ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’”, a principle criticised by many Western players 
with international donors such as the World Bank usually tying their loans to a set of policies to 
be implemented by the recipient country, e. g. anti-corruption measures, in order to, allegedly, 
further accelerate the recipient country's development. 
Yet the Chinese dam developers’ emphasis of host country social safeguard norms could imply 
that no norms whatsoever were adopted since no codified social safeguards policies were in 
place in Myanmar and Cambodia in the early 2000s, as outlined in the previous section. An 
example of a Chinese-led dam project commenced in the early 2000s that was particularly 
criticised for its lacking social safeguards (with farmers allegedly resettled to non-arable land, a 
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major violation of distributional social justice) is Myanmar's Paunglaung Dam whose construction 
started in 2004 (Lone, 2013; International Rivers, 2014). 
Social safeguard policies were in place in Laos in the early 2000s, but it is contested that these 
were (and are) adhered to by Chinese players. A Chinese-led project whose construction started 
in 2001 “without public consultation or participatory planning” (Sayatham and Suhardiman, 2015) 
(and thus lacking procedural social justice) is the Nam Mang 3 Dam. Also there are seven dam 
projects pursued by Sinohydro on the Nam Ou River since 2011; these are particularly criticised 
for the limited information provided about them and are allegedly built with very little oversight 
from the Lao government (with the government not even having the financial resources to visit 
the site at times). These projects thus also reportedly lack procedural social justice 
Kircherr et al (2017) note that various relevant pieces of safeguards legislation were introduced 
by Chinese authorities in recent years. While their adoption is voluntary, as outlined in the 
previous section, International Rivers still calls them "a signal to overseas dam builders […] to 
act responsibly". NGOs – the key watchdogs of dam developers – were the most critical 
regarding current project performance. Of the 13 NGOs responding to this question, over 75% 
believed current project performance was poor from a social safeguards perspective.  The 
ambiguity found in the interviews is also reflected in two recent rankings, compiled by 
International Rivers (see figure below). 
 
Overall, the interviewees believed that international norms may soon prevail in projects 
implemented by Chinese dam developers, though. "The Chinese have now understood that it is 
not sufficient if there is a stamp on all of your papers and all permits are approved", an NGO 
leader collaborating with a major Chinese dam developer said. "It is now widely accepted [by 
Chinese dam developers] that affected people are the first beneficiaries", a representative from a 
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global dam association said when asked about distributional justice in Chinese-led dam projects. 
The prevalence of international norms in Chinese-led dam projects may not silence critics, as 
already indicated in the previous section, since the various international norms remain contested. 
For instance, the Theun Hinboun Dam project in Laos led by Statkraft, a Nordic player, was 
called a benchmark for social safeguard norms. Yet both procedural and distributional social 
safeguards deficiencies regarding Theun Hinboun were portrayed by Whitington (2012) and 
Virtanen (2006). 
Ways to improve the implementation of safeguards in infrastructure projects (from 
Kircherr et al 2017) 
1. Improvements in social safeguard policies are induced by rational cost benefit- 
calculations of the Chinese dam developer – with the adoption of various international 
social safeguards ultimately less costly than their non-adoption. Social impacts “are just 
problems to get around", an NGO leader said, so the benefits need to outweigh the costs. 
2. "Chinese dam developers are very, very sensitive to public pressure” Kitcherr’s 
interviews showed. A Chinese dam developer acknowledged that "[protests can] lead to 
project suspensions [and thus additional costs]. To carry on, we have sometimes had to 
radically change our project management approach” social mobilisation as a root cause 
for norm adoption in the private sector. For instance, Laos’ Nam-Lik 1–2 Dam (with 
construction starting in 2007) was criticised regarding its compensation scheme with the 
infrastructure provided to resettlees allegedly being substandard. A second project also 
criticised for its limited social safeguards is Cambodia's Kamchay Dam (whose 
construction started in 2008) (Siciliano et al., 2015; Middleton et al., 2015; Hensengerth, 
2015).  
3. A third controversial project that allegedly was influential in changing the norms adopted 
in Chinese-led dam projects was Myanmar's Myitsone Dam. The project was suspended 
in 2011 due to massive public protests (Lynn, 2011; Linn, 2013). “This suspension was a 
really painful punch in the stomach”, a Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum 
participant said. Only upon the suspension of the Myitsone Dam project, did Chinese 
dam developers begin to see the halting of a project by a government in Myanmar, Laos 
and Cambodia (partly) due to lacking social safeguards as a credible scenario. 
4. “Chinese state owned enterprises learnt a great deal out of the Myitsone project”, a 
former employee of a Chinese dam developer stated.  Therefore supporting host country 
groups to promote safeguarding is important. Social mobilisation likely has led to stricter 
host country and Chinese legislation, stricter rules of Chinese funders (partly as a 
consequence of Chinese governmental legislation) as well as cooperation with 
international players – both via ESIAs and beyond. The collaboration with various 
international players was meant to not only to fend off civil society criticism, but also 
intended to address capacity issues of Chinese dam developers regarding social 
safeguards since these developers are not responsible for social safeguards when 
implementing projects in China (this is the responsibility of the Chinese government). 
Social mobilisation plays a key role in this process.  
5. NGOs are an extremely important actor, and it is important to support them. One 
interviewee said ‘They are the independent police force that always will nag you and bite 
you and keep on your tail and make sure that you stay in line as a big, gigantic 
international cooperation’. 
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6. A fixed social safeguard budget can be useful, so that it is not slashed when project costs 
overrun. 
7. "[Chinese dam developers] performed strongest at the project site if they were forced to 
do so by the laws of the host country". These government policy changes in standards 
are believed to be driven by social mobilization.  So, it is important to support host 
country governments. 
8. Those financing Chinese dams overseas (mainly China Exim Bank (CEB) and China 
Development Bank) adopted stricter social safeguard norms due to social mobilisation, 
which then, in turn, had to be adopted by the dam developer. CEB's evolved approach to 
environmental and social safeguards is reflected in its action regarding Gabon's Belinga 
Dam, for instance, with CEB suspending funding for the dam of upon safeguards 
concerns raised by various NGOs (Bosshard, 2010). 
9. The research also suggests that Chinese dam developers now increasingly view the 
adoption of international social safeguards norms as less costly than their non-adoption.  
10. The impacts of activists regarding the adoption of international social safeguards. This 
suggests that policy-makers keen to ensure adoption of international social safeguards in 
Chinese-led dam projects could usefully provide targeted funding for relevant 
environmental NGOs, in addition to the more obvious remedy of expanding host 
countries’ capacity to develop and implement more robust social safeguard legislation 
and regulations. These can then continue to play and possibly expand their role as 
watchdogs of the dam industry. We note, though, that this recommendation is only 
tentative. Indeed, more single case study research is needed to further nuance the 
narrative from this regional case study.   
11. One example of an organisation working on this is: International Rivers 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/successes-for-the-movement International Rivers 
has been a part of the global struggle to protect rivers and the people who depend on 
them for over thirty years. We often work with our partners to oppose large, destructive 
hydropower projects. But we also promote energy and water solutions that benefit the 
poor without causing the massive impacts of large dams. And we advocate for planning 
and decision-making processes that give local communities a place at the negotiating 
table. 
4. Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa 
Chinese players are now Africa’s key partner for its infrastructure sector (including water supply 
projects), providing approximately two-thirds of investments since 2007. Kircherr et al (2016) 
write that the ‘social impacts of these engagements during the construction phase are mostly 
portrayed in an alarmist tone within the popular press. Meanwhile, scholarly literature 
investigating them remains scarce’. Chinese dam developers claim to construct at least every 
second dam worldwide (Kircherr 2017). However, scholarly literature comprehensively 
investigating the social safeguard norms in these projects is rare (Kircherr et al 2017). 
Kircherr et al 2016 focus on the Bui Dam, a major dam in Ghana, financed by China Exim Bank 
(CEB), the largest financier of infrastructure in Africa, and constructed by Sinohydro, the largest 
dam developer worldwide, as a case study to explore social impacts of Chinese engagements in 
the African water sector. A key criticism of the Chinese players in Africa is the lack of social 
safeguards. Whereas the World Bank's safeguard policies "are aspirational for [Sinohydro], at the 
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project level, local laws and regulations form the basic safeguards" for the company 
(International Rivers 2014: 2). In many developing markets, these local laws and regulations are 
underdeveloped, frequently even non-existent, as also acknowledged by a Chinese dam 
developer.  
The paper found that social safeguards policies were not within the responsibility of Sinohydro. 
Furthermore, financing modalities were largely favourable from a Ghanaian perspective, 
comparable to World Bank conditions, partly due to the successful negotiations (from the 
Ghanaian standpoint) during the planning and design phase of the project. Most likely, the 
project would not have been implemented if CEB had not stepped in to provide funding.  
The research also showed that most workers employed during construction were Ghanaian, paid 
significantly above the country’s minimum wage. Nevertheless, working conditions overall were 
questionable. This case study highlights how Chinese engagement in construction of water 
infrastructure may help develop projects otherwise stuck in the planning and design phase. 
However, labour conditions during the construction phase of these projects need to be carefully 
managed (Kircherr et al 2016). 
The Bui Dam may now operate for up to 100 years, providing irrigation for 30,000 ha of land as 
well as up to 980 GWh of electricity annually. However, that does come at an environmental and 
social cost. For water supply projects, where international funding is used without strong 
safeguards imposed, it remains the responsibility of the country to ensure environmental and 
social impacts are mitigated. One key area that was highlighted by this case study is the need for 
better management of labour conditions (Kircherr et al 2016). 
Improvements for the implementation of safeguarding policies 
1. For the Bui Dam, one of the criticisms – from a social safeguard perspective – is the lack 
of an appropriate consultation process during the construction of the Bui Dam: "None of 
the people […] had any idea of when they were to be resettled, when they could expect 
compensation or how to make their grievances known". The interviewee conveys the 
impression this lack of consultation may be due to Sinohydro. "[The] evidence suggests 
[…] that consultation and participation has been kept to a minimum level so that 
construction can run as smoothly as possible." However, for the Bui Dam there is 
evidence that a range of stakeholders and communities were engaged in consultation, 
and further that it was not the role of Sinohydro to engage in the consultation and design 
social safeguards. This finding regarding roles and responsibilities of Sinohydro in dam 
projects is echoed by scholars investigating Chinese dam projects in the Mekong River 
Basin (Matthews & Motta 2013: 5).  
2. The paper also identifies 6 players were key to its construction.  This is important to see 




3. An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) was carried out by 
Environmental Resources Management (ERM), a British firm, including public 
consultations: "During scoping, […] focus group discussions in the villages during which 
villagers’ perceptions and expectations were discussed. A national consultation meeting 
[…] was well attended by over 120 participants from a wide range of [civil society 
organizations]". Civil society and those to be resettled continued to be involved during the 
construction period via the Ghana Dams Dialogue; between 84 and 150 stakeholders 
participated in each dialogue session. "Affected people have been sufficiently consulted 
at all levels of their resettlement".  
4. An international donor interviewed by Kircherr et al pointed out how Ghana carefully 
studied a prior project’s failing to ensure that the Bui Dam project did not repeat past. 
This prior project was the Akosombo Dam, constructed by an Italian consortium 
(Impregilo) from 1961 to 1965, and funded by the World Bank, the United States and the 
United Kingdom. It was originally conceptualised "as the engine of Ghana's accelerated 
transformation [removing] the shackles of colonialism" (Miescher 2014: 341ff.). However, 
many Ghanaians nowadays particularly remember the resettlement of 80,000 people due 
to the project, according to a new social media activist interviewed (Interview 
T20052015a); "different tribes [were] thrown together into standardized housing, [there 
was] inadequate water supply, poor soil" (Mettle 2011: 47). Sinohydro, as the 
construction contractor, was neither involved in the ESIA on the Bui Dam nor in the 
implementation of the resettlement scheme.  
5. A World Bank official told us, that "the approaches the Chinese banks follow change and 
they change really fast. They are now much more in sync with the approach the World 
Bank and other development partners have because they learned from the difficulties 
they encountered". In the case of the Bui Dam, we did not find any evidence that CEB 
provided specific oversight. Limited oversight may have been needed in any case. After 
all, the ESIA was carried out by an established international player and "resettlement 
overall actually was rather smooth", a representative from the Ghana Dams Dialogue 
noted. The combination of CEB and Sinohydro in a water supply dam project is typical for 
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Chinese-funded water projects in Africa. In order to promote trade, loans by CEB are 
frequently tied to the participation of Chinese contractors in the project, in this case 
Sinohydro (Foster et al. 2008: 1). This combination reflects again the triple aim of China's 
foreign policy: Creating new profit pools for its SOEs, providing development assistance 
and strengthening ties to African leaders. 
5. The Theun Hinboun Dam project in Laos led by Statkraft 
The Theun Hinboun Dam project in Laos led by Statkraft, a Nordic player, was called a 
benchmark for social safeguard norms. Yet both procedural and distributional social safeguards 
deficiencies regarding Theun Hinboun were portrayed by Whitington (2012) and Virtanen (2006). 
Statkraft put in the following safeguarding measures (Stakraft 2010): 
During the preparation of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), a small number of ethnic minority 
and vulnerable groups were identified. Ethnic minorities are defined as being culturally different 
from the mainstream culture (lowland Lao), heavily reliant on natural resources, with unique 
languages and traditions and having little or no political representation. In the project area the 
majority of people are lowland Lao or related groups but there are also a small number of Mon-
Khmer groups who traditionally have resided in the middle-hills (ca. 60 households), and Hmong, 
an upland group (ca. 80 households). The Asian Development Bank has a specific Safeguard 
Policy for Indigenous People and Ethnic Minorities. Vulnerable groups are classified on a 
household level as households that do not have adequate labour resources, such as households 
with single parents and young children, elderly couples, households with disabled members, etc. 
Experience from hydropower and other infrastructure development indicates that additional 
resources and funds are required in order to ensure that ethnic minorities and vulnerable groups 
improve their standards of living and become project beneficiaries. For this reason, the Social 
and Environmental Division has introduced a number of measures: employing ethnic minority 
people as staff in order to facilitate consultations with these groups, carrying out separate 
consultations and intense discussions on group and household levels, having an international 
anthropologist make regular visits and reports on status, and assigning staff specifically to follow 
up on these groups very closely. 
Aspects of the approach that could be useful for other projects: 
o Consultations in local languages and as separate ethnic groups to ensure that all points 
of view are recorded and that the weakest groups participate  
o Different house designs that are specific to the different groups • Village layouts that 
group the different ethnic minorities together 
o Each group carrying out rituals and religious ceremonies prior to resettlement  
o Additional technical assistance for the weakest members of society during the restoration 
of livelihoods at the new resettlement sites – having technical staff work directly with 
households  
o Assistance for food security (protein and rice) and additional medical support There are 
considerable challenges in working with vulnerable groups and ethnic minorities. 
An “affirmative action” approach is new and contradicts traditional hierarchical thinking. Ethnic 
minorities have different socio-economic systems and cultural values from the majority, and one 
has to contend with stereotypes and prejudices when attempting to provide additional support. In 
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addition, the resettlement process has established higher standards of houses, infrastructure and 
services for all, leveling the social hierarchy of villages to some extent. While this has pleased 
most people, those who were formally exploiting poorer villagers are trying to reassert the former 
hierarchy. SED will continue to have staff full-time at all sites to ensure that these groups receive 
assistance and, in some cases, protection. All ethnic minorities are monitored separately for 
income and education. 
6. Infrastructure projects in Cambodia 
Sustainable use of Cambodia’s natural resources is a key factor to the country’s development 
(MWPT 2010). Approximately three-quarters of the population are directly engaged in agriculture 
and depend upon the land for their daily subsistence. Agriculture and forestry contribute nearly 
40 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Tourism, which is based on the 
country’s cultural and natural wonders, also contributes significantly to economic development. 
Reliance on these industries means that sustainable management of natural resources and other 
aspects of the environment are vital for improving rural livelihoods and for economic growth. 
Upgradation and maintenance of roads and highways is a prerequisite for the development of a 
under developed countries like Cambodia. The MWPT (2010) paper shows an example of how a 
ministry can ensure good implementation of safeguard policies. 
‘It is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) and MRD policy to ensure that road 
development, including maintenance works, do not cause negative impacts on the local physical, 
biological as well as natural environmental including local communities. To achieve this objective, 
it is the responsibility of MPWT’s/MRD to ensure that appropriate action, including monitoring, 
are undertaken during the project planning, designing, pre-construction, construction and post 
construction phases. Safeguard compliances performance of contractors is considered important 
and will be monitored closely because environmental management plan compliances is part 
Environmental Safeguard.  
Efforts will be made to incorporate measures to reduce, minimise or compensate the associated 
impact that may occur during various phases of the project. MPWT’s/MRD staff will also ensure 
that information related to the environmental and social impacts of the project is made available 
for the local public for review and will promote/ maintain close consultation and cooperation with 
local communities and local authorities.  
Simultaneously with environmental safeguards, there is cause for being concerned about the 
social dimensions of projects. Involuntary resettlement is a complicated subject. To achieve 
resettlement objectives remains an inherently risky proposition and new projects bring to the fore 
new resettlement issues or challenges. The primary objectives of these guidelines in the paper 
are to provide detailed guidance to the project proponents in addressing social issues in 
development projects specifically in planning and implementation of resettlement plans, ethnic 
minority development plans, where necessary. The Guidelines also provide guidance for 
conducting social assessment in projects with indirect impacts on population within or beyond the 
project boundaries. The Guidelines explain in detail the processes and procedures necessary for 
collection of data, surveys and preparation of various documents in accordance with the 
provisions of the National Policy on Resettlement and Compensation, Herein after called the 
‘Policy’. The guidelines cover all phases of project process from project identification to 
implementation and post-implementation evaluation of resettlement activities on development 
projects’ (MWPT 2010). 
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One example is environmental protection: 
Environmental Assessment: The First Objective is to help ensure the environmental and social 
soundness and sustainability of investment projects. The operational principle is to use a 
screening process for each proposed project, as early as possible, to determine the appropriate 
extent and type of environmental assessment (EA) so that appropriate studies are undertaken 
proportional to potential risks and to direct, and, as relevant, indirect, cumulative, and associated 
impacts. Use sectoral or regional environmental assessment when appropriate. The Second 
Objective is to support integration of environmental and social aspects of projects into the 
decision.  
Ways to improve the implementation of infrastructure projects (MWPT 2010) 
1. Assessment of potential impacts of the proposed project on physical, biological, 
socioeconomic and physical cultural resources, including trans-boundary and global 
concerns, and potential impacts on human health and safety,  
2. Assessment of the adequacy of the applicable legal and institutional framework, including 
applicable international environmental agreements, and confirm that they provide that the 
cooperating government does not finance project activities that would contravene such 
international obligations,  
3. Making provision for the assessment of feasible investment, technical, and siting 
alternatives, including the "no action" alternative, potential impacts, feasibility of 
mitigating these impacts, their capital and recurrent costs, their suitability under local 
conditions, and their institutional, training and monitoring requirements associated with 
them,  
4. Where applicable to the type of project being supported, normal application of the 
Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook (PPAH). Justification of the deviations 
when alternatives to measures set forth in the PPAH are selected, is to be provided;  
5. Prevent and, where not possible to prevent, at least minimize, or compensate for adverse 
project impacts and enhance positive impacts through environmental management and 
planning that includes the proposed mitigation measures, monitoring, institutional 
capacity development and training measures, an implementation schedule, and cost 
estimates,  
6. Involve stakeholders, including project-affected groups and local nongovernmental 
organizations, as early as possible, in the preparation process and ensure that their 
views and concerns are made known to decision makers and taken into account. 
Continue consultations throughout project implementation as necessary to address EA 
related issues that affect them,  
7. Use of independent expertise in the preparation of EA where appropriate. Use 
independent advisory panels during preparation and implementation of projects that are 
highly risky or contentious or that involve serious and multi-dimensional environmental 
and/or social concerns, and  
8. Provision of measures to link the environmental assessment process and findings with 
studies of economic, financial, institutional, social and technical analyses of a proposed 
project. In addition provision has to be made for the application of the principles as above 
to sub-projects under investment and financial intermediary activities.  
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EA is a process whose breadth, depth, and type of analysis depend on the nature, scale, and 
potential environmental impact of the proposed project. EA evaluates a project's potential 
environmental risks and impacts in its area of influence; examines project alternatives; identifies 
ways of improving project selection, sitting, planning, design, and implementation by preventing, 
minimising, mitigating, or compensating for adverse environmental impacts and enhancing 
positive impacts; and includes the process of mitigating and managing adverse environmental 
impacts throughout project implementation. The Bank favours preventive measures over 
mitigatory or compensatory measures, whenever feasible. EA takes into account the natural 
environment (air, water, and land); human health and safety; social aspects (involuntary 
resettlement, indigenous peoples, and physical cultural resources); and trans-boundary and 
global environmental aspects. EA considers natural and social aspects in an integrated way. It 
also takes into account the variations in project and country conditions; the findings of country 
environmental studies; national environmental action plans; the country's overall policy 
framework, national legislation, and institutional capabilities related to the environment and social 
aspects; and obligations of the country, pertaining to project activities, under relevant 
international environmental treaties and agreements. 
7. Road infrastructure in Africa 
Over the last 15 years, the road sector in Africa has made great progress in both institutional and 
financing terms, in particular with the creation of road agencies and road funds financed, in many 
countries, from fuel levies, so that 80 per cent of the main road network in Africa is now deemed 
to be in either good or fair condition (World Bank 2010). 
While there has undoubtedly been progress, the challenges remain immense. With an average of 
204 kilometres of roads per 1,000 square kilometres of which only one quarter are paved, the 
density of national roads lags far behind the world average of 944 kilometres per 1,000 square 
kilometres, of which more than half are paved. According to the World Bank, in addition to the 
current small number of major regional trunk roads linking deep-sea ports to economic 
hinterlands, comprising no more than 10,000 kilometres, “[b]etween 60,000 and 100,000 
kilometres of roads are required to provide intracontinental connectivity” in Africa. Low road 
density also means that Africa’s fast-growing cities are affected by increasing congestion, which 
has an impact not only on economic development but is also a significant source of pollution and 
accidents. With a road traffic injury fatality rate of 32.2 per 100,000 inhabitants
- 
the corresponding 
rate in countries such as Sweden, the UK and France is between four and eight deaths per 
100,000 population– African roads are the most dangerous in the world (Africa Energy Forum 
2016). 
The sub-Saharan African road network is still underdeveloped. Medium- and long-distance 
national and international corridors need to be developed or improved, so as to allow connectivity 
between capitals and other major urban and industrial centres. International corridors will benefit 
landlocked countries in particular, providing them with much-needed road access to deep-sea 
ports. There is also a need to facilitate all-season road connections between major cities and 
provincial regions, in particular “higher value agricultural regions” and mining areas, and to 
decongest high-density cities by building new, wider and safer paved roads facilitating access to, 
and circulation within, such cities (Africa Energy Forum 2016). 
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Land acquisition and environmental impacts (Africa Energy Forum 2016) 
Land acquisition is always a sensitive issue in road projects (as with any linear infrastructure 
projects, such as rail and pipeline projects). Land acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
safeguarding of the selected land corridor raise issues which are common to the development of 
infrastructure in most developing countries. For example, urban road projects crossing shanty 
towns raise not only individual expropriation compensation issues but also wider social concerns, 
as they generally require the displacement and resettlement of families as well as of economic 
and commercial activities.  
The concession or PPP contract will often impose certain specific compensatory obligations on 
the private sector concessionaire or the PPP company which can sometimes extend beyond the 
normal scope of obligations of a roads concessionaire; for example, noise protection walls, 
planting of green spaces, improving sanitation and funding of community activities. 
In rural areas, tribal land ownership rules can make land acquisition a long and complex 
exercise. Similarly, the environmental impact of the proposed road must be assessed and taken 
into account, including through environmental mitigation and compensation measures. For 
example, the first stretch of the Dakar-Diamniadio Highway project crosses the Mbao and 
Sébikhotane classified forests, which has resulted in the contract imposing specific 
environmental protection constraints and measures. As in the case of other infrastructure and 
power projects, the identification and proper management of environmental issues is particularly 
important for road projects involving multilateral agencies and international commercial lenders, 
which have increasingly stringent environmental and social impact management and 
compensation requirements. 
8. Implementation of Asian Development Bank’s 
Safeguarding Policies  
This evaluation (Asian Development Bank 2016) examines the value added by the environmental 
and involuntary resettlement safeguards policies of ADB, and identifies what remains to be done 
to ensure their effective application. The evaluation uses a case study approach to assess the 
application of ADB’s safeguards in 12 projects in three countries, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Sri Lanka. These countries were considered to be around the median in terms of the 
environmental and involuntary resettlement sensitivity of their roads, energy and water projects. 
The evaluation shows that while ADB’s safeguard framework is seen as a benchmark there are 
areas that need strengthening in matters of design and especially implementation. It indicates 
both the progress and remaining gaps in both country safeguard systems and implementation of 
the safeguard policy for application to ADB-supported projects. A seminal benefits-cost analysis 
(BCA) concludes that safeguards implementation creates a positive net value, which tends to be 
higher for ADB’s standards. The evaluation specifies that strong caution must continue to be 
exercised in moving to the use of country safeguard systems for ADB supported projects. An 
assessment of Indonesia’s safeguard system shows that concerning involuntary resettlement, 
there are legal and regulatory differences with the ADB policy and these need to be addressed. 
Further, in all countries visited there were gaps in local implementation capacities within the 
relevant agencies. At the same time, the evaluation points out that ADB’s program to promote 
the use of country safeguard systems in ADB supported projects should be more strategic and 
systematic, as indicated by the Safeguard Policy Statement (2009). 
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This evaluation draws on five sources: (i) analysis of ADB and government documents, (ii) 
country case studies, (iii) portfolio analysis of approved projects in 2007–2015, (iv) benefit–cost 
analysis, and (v) interviews with ADB staff and stakeholders. The country case studies provide a 
realtime assessment of ADB’s safeguard implementation in Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Sri Lanka. 
These countries were selected because of (i) their significance in major ADB regions; (ii) the 
availability of documents to assess CSS; (iii) the mix of projects in ADB’s primary investment 
sectors (transport, energy, and water) with environment and social safeguard categories A and 
B; and (iv) implementation of projects at central and local levels. 
Ways to improve implementation of safeguarding: 
Environment: 
 Project implementation. The group of projects assessed in the three countries shows that 
while environmental lapses in compliance are mostly avoided due to the environmental 
plans, these lapses remain a risk due to insufficient government supervision and 
monitoring, and also insufficient monitoring by ADB. 
 Strengthening of country safeguard systems. EIA legislation was found to constitute a 
good foundation for safeguard work in all three countries but local capacity for 
implementation is weak in all but a few of the agencies reviewed in the course of the 
project case studies. 
 Use of country safeguard systems in ADB supported projects. The analysis for Indonesia 
found a basic equivalence between the Indonesia environmental laws and regulations, 
and ADB’s SPS. Nevertheless, five areas were identified of ambivalence in the 
legislation. No acceptability assessment was done for any agency, but observations from 
the field in the context of the project case studies led to the conclusion that if ADB grants 
the use of CSS in Indonesia for some projects, then gap filling action plans will need to 
deal with both the resolution of the ambivalences and capacity and readiness problems 
of agencies. 
Involuntary Resettlement 
 The group of projects reviewed suggests that there are significant issues in the 
preparation of involuntary resettlement plans. Several plans had insufficient attention for 
livelihood restoration measures, and were more generally built on rushed assessments 
and limited consultation, even when they were updated after project approval when there 
was more time. GRMs were not always worked out, and insufficient attention was 
sometimes given to institutional constraints in the government agencies responsible, and 
administrative arrangements. 
 Project implementation. The case study projects indicate insufficiencies in recording, and 
more importantly problems in delivering compensations. Among seven projects which 
had reached the stage of resettlement plan implementation, only those in Sri Lanka 
operating under SPS could provide the evaluation team with records on compensation 
delivery. Overall, not all entitlements that the SPS mandates were delivered in the seven 
projects. This was particularly noticeable in the lack of special attention for poor and 
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vulnerable affected people, and the lack of properly worked out livelihood restoration 
measures. 
 Strengthening of country safeguard systems. The review of the three country cases 
shows that there is progress in the development of CSS, but gaps remain particularly in 
the quality of local implementation capacity. 
 Use of country safeguard systems in ADB supported projects. The analysis for Indonesia 
found four equivalence gaps and three partial gaps between the Indonesian laws and 
regulations on the one hand and ADB’s SPS on the other. 
Based on the findings and conclusion of this evaluation, the following four priority 
recommendations were offered to improve the implementation of safeguarding policies: 
 Integrate safeguard work early in the project preparation and provide adequate time and 
resources to this task. Good safeguard measures need to start early and it takes time to 
obtain a good understanding of the borrower project, procurement and budget cycles, 
and safeguard management capacities and responsibilities. It requires discipline to 
ensure safeguards readiness and establish a workable grievance redress mechanism 
well before land acquisition and civil works start. It requires early monitoring, in order to 
be able to focus on the critical period of delivering entitlements. For both environment 
and involuntary resettlement safeguards, the poverty, gender and social analysis should 
be well integrated during the early stages, so that the right safeguard categorizations can 
be selected and the right plans can be made for livelihood restoration, and with special 
attention to the poor and the vulnerable among the affected people. 
 Step up safeguard implementation support internally and in country agencies to fully 
achieve the safeguard policy objectives. Close supervision and monitoring is needed and 
this will be facilitated by deploying the necessary staff in headquarters and resident 
missions. Like project preparation, project implementation requires a good understanding 
of the legal steps, financing, mandates and responsibilities for safeguard application at all 
levels, and targeted capacity building for counterparts. Providing extra support for the 
poor and vulnerable affected and seeing livelihood programs through to completion – or 
beyond completion when necessary – are a must if ADB’s safeguard policy principles are 
to be fully applied. ADB portfolio monitoring systems should be improved such that 
project officers and safeguard specialists are able to flag expected delays and lapses in 
safeguards well before they materialise. Government monitoring systems to report on the 
progress of safeguard measures need to be supported so that they are improved. 
 Continue to exercise strong caution in proceeding with use of CSS, ensuring that the high 
ADB standards and its reputation are properly safeguarded; and systematically 
strengthen the CSS through dedicated technical assistance, especially the local 
implementation capacities, to pave the way toward its use in ADB supported projects. 
ADB’s TA work is very suitable in building tangible capacity to promote legal and 
technical changes in CSS to lift standards and provide capacity development to improve 
agencies. The current country safeguards review protocol can be exploited further to 
enable regular assessments of the CSS and its appropriateness for use in ADB projects 
to be conducted for agencies with more advanced safeguard capacity. When the use of 
CSS is deemed appropriate for a pilot in some sector, area and agency (particularly for 
environmental safeguards), it will be prudent to appoint more staff in the resident 
missions with good knowledge of legal and policy requirements in the country, and a 
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background in specialized safeguard areas (a shift in some regional departments is 
already happening also without such piloting. 
 Determine whether (a) the disclosure arrangements for involuntary resettlement plans, 
and (b) the definition and functioning of grievance redress mechanisms deserve more 
attention, and take appropriate actions. Rigorous assessment of GRMs regarding 
accessibility, transparency, fairness, and protection in projects is needed. Local, pre-
existing grievance facilities may form the basis of the GRM providing they offer meet the 
key criteria access and fair process to all affected people, including women, without fear 
of retribution. An internal review of all aspects of GRMs by ADB may be helpful to clarify 
to staff what counts as effective disclosure of resettlement plans and what counts as a 
minimally acceptable GRM.  
9. Additional useful resources 
Many safeguarding toolkits are available at: http://www.keepingchildrensafe.org.uk/resources  
 
Environmental protection of infrastructure projects in South Africa 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/reports/epip15years_review.pdf 
Based on the newly established branch, Environmental Protection and Infrastructure 
Programmes (EPIP) was also reconfigured with new programmes being brought into the new 
fold. To purpose of EPIP is to manage the identification, planning and implementation of the 
Environmental Protection and Infrastructure Programmes (Working on Waste, Working for the 
Coast, People & Parks, Wildlife Economy, Working for Land, Greening & Open Space 
Management and Youth Environmental Service throughout the country under the Expanded 
Public Works Programme using labour intensive methods targeting the unemployed, youth, 
women, people with disabilities and SMMEs. The main goal of the programme is to alleviate 
poverty through a number of interventions that are implemented in communities to uplift 
households especially those headed by women while empowering beneficiaries to participate in 
the mainstream economy in a manner that addresses the environmental management 
challenges facing the country.   
The EIOP will contribute to these objectives by:  
 Strengthening environmental protection in its contribution to improving the quality of life,  
 Developing infrastructure in such a way as to respect the environment as a basis for 
economic transition,  
 Developing infrastructure networks so enabling disadvantaged areas to develop 
economically 
DFID (2008) Desk review of DFID’s Private Sector Infrastructure Investment Facilities: 
Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67761/ev685.pdf 
Promoting sustainable resource use has environmental and economic implications. Taxation and 
subsidy policies to encourage better energy efficiency and the increased use of alternative 
energy sources can limit environmental damage and safeguard long-term energy supplies. 
This paper provides some examples of safeguarding for example: 
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InfraCo is also able to draw upon the resources of other Facilities to form a total package that 
can mitigate some environmental risk. For example: In Uganda, the Kalangala Infrastructure 
Services Project is on the verge on fruition. InfraCo is developing a single large commercial 
project that will eventually be sold to the private sector; the project is made up of four distinct 
infrastructure components – a ferry refurbishment, water supply, electricity supply and local road 
improvements. International consultants have been engaged to undertake extensive public 
consultation works and to undertake an EIA that will satisfy national requirements as well as 
applicable WB safeguard policies. A number of local contractors will assume responsibility for a 
complex project that they have no previous experience of implementing or managing. 
Recognising the risk, TAF is being employed to provide TA to the contractors, both on 
construction methods and environmental monitoring. 
With over 55 projects implemented there is a substantial body of available evidence to indicate 
that WB environmental safeguards are being followed. The 2007 GPOBA review cites the 
example of the Naandi Water Project in Andhra Pradesh, India. As part of the project preparation 
for this innovative water supply project, environmental and social studies were undertaken by WB 
to WB standards. The environmental studies are undertaken by the borrower and then reviewed 
by WB environmental and social specialists. 
As all projects are subject to WB safeguard policies environmental and social compliance studies 
form part of the on-going monitoring process. Each grant is the responsibility of a WB task PIDG 
Facilities 12 manager. If it is a non Bank project this will be GPOBA staff (who are also WB staff). 
The task manager must ensure that the usual Bank policies of follow-up, including supervision 
missions are incorporated in mid-term reviews and implementation completion reports. 
Additional ways to improve implementation of safeguarding policies: 
 Sub-contracting the environmental due diligence process to a third party provides 
objective oversight within a set budget. A set policy removes all potential for conflict of 
interest. 
 
Farrington, J., and Robinson, M., 2006, 'Introduction: Meeting the Challenges to Growth 
and Poverty Reduction' Development Policy Review, number 24, pp. 3-12 
http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/introduction-meeting-the-challenges-to-growth-and-
poverty-reduction/ 
Countries in East and South-East Asia have focused on growth, targeted through the promotion 
of liberalisation, stability, private investment, infrastructure and skills development. In South Asia, 
more public expenditure has been directed towards service delivery and social protection. 
Growth and poverty reduction can be threatened by external factors, related to the global 
economy, and internal variables, like governance, infrastructure and migration.  
Various Asian development trends up to the MDG target date of 2015 are identified:  
 Strong economic growth will continue, led by a vibrant commercial sector. 
 Income poverty will fall, although only half the region’s countries are set to meet the 
target to halve hunger. 
 Environmental indicators – pollution, water availability, cultivable land availability, illegal 
logging – will probably deteriorate. 
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 Internal migration will lead to a majority of the population living in cities, with major 
demographic and socio-economic implications. 
 Public participation will probably increase, with growing civil society activity. 
 Gender and ethnic discrimination may lessen, although major disparities will persist. 
 Basic education enrolment is rising, although high drop-out rates exist among girls. 
 Child and maternal mortality rates remain high among minority groups and disease 
prevention programmes are still inadequate. 
Average growth rates mask disparities between and within Asian countries, while fast growth can 
undermine social stability. Governments and international agencies should focus on enhancing 
equality, governance, private sector activity and environmental sustainability.  
World Bank Project in Cameroon 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2016/09/world-bank-project-fails-safeguard-rights-
workers-cameroon/ 
Cameroon has ratified most International Labour Organisation conventions regulating labour and 
living conditions of workers. World Bank clients are obliged to enforce Bank directives on 
occupational health and safety and its safeguard policies. Despite these regulatory frameworks, 
China International Water and Electric Corporation (CWE) has grossly violated labour rights on 
the World Bank-financed Lom Pangar Hydro Power Project under the watchful eyes of the 
Cameroonian government and the project owner Electricity Development Corporation of 
Cameroon (EDC). The World Bank financed 44.75 per cent of the total $295 million loan made to 
the project. 
Despite repeated complaints made to the Bank by workers during Bank missions to evaluate 
progress in environmental and social management, human rights violations persist. Workers 
complain of unpaid work; corporal punishment; non-payment of social security contributions; 
dismissal and absolute neglect. Abandonment of work accident victims and discrimination in 
favour of Chinese workers were amongst other serious concerns evidenced by frequent industrial 
actions and more than ten cases filed at the local Bertoua courts and the labour inspector’s 
office. 
Disturbed by inhumane living and working conditions at Lom Pangar, some current and former 
workers filed a complaint to the World Bank Grievance Redress System, including a request for 
the complete payment of their unpaid lodging allowances and overtime pay and the 
reinstatement of all workers dismissed after testing hepatitis B positive. While the GRS is 
considering all breaches of worker’s rights mentioned above, it seeks to waive the mandatory 
requirements for compensations regarding inadequate lodging conditions arguing that the 
contract between the Bank and the Government of Cameroon does not make reference to 
housing conditions. However, before funding the project, the Bank obliged EDC to conduct an 
environmental and social impact assessment. This resulted in an environmental and social 
management plan requiring EDC to ensure the contractor (CWE) respects the plan and 
environmental and social guidelines based on both national legislation and World Bank 
safeguard policies. 
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Made in Africa Foundation 
http://www.madeinafricafoundation.com/#mission 
Providing finance for feasibility studies for African businesses and projects involved in the 
development of major infrastructure projects across Africa 
 
Developing countries told: Implement safeguard measures for infrastructure projects 
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/developing-countries-told-implement-safeguard-measures-for-
infra-projects/ 
The Independent Evaluation Department (IED) at the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has urged 
the Manila-based multilateral institution and developing member countries (DMCs) to implement 
stronger safeguard measures for infrastructure projects. 
In a news statement, the IED said infrastructure demand in Asia’s developing economies, 
including the Philippines, can reach $8 trillion until 2020. With this demand, IED said the ADB 
and DMCs like the Philippines must be more vigilant in the financing and implementation of these 
projects. 
“Narrowing wide infrastructure gaps will be vital for Asia to secure strong and sustained growth,” 
Marvin Taylor-Dormond, director general of Independent Evaluation at the ADB, said. “Robust 
safeguards to protect the environment and affected communities are needed more than ever, 
amid the risk of increasing environmental degradation and the rising threat of climate change.” 
The IED report found that few government agencies employed regular environmental specialists 
to enforce safeguards on ADB-financed projects, and that ADB’s specialists were overstretched. 
It added that there are also gaps in the involuntary resettlement of people affected by new 
infrastructure, such as roads, on land owned by them. IED said ADB’s safeguards policy also 
requires the government to provide compensation for lost assets at replacement value, and 
special livelihood support for the poor to get them to national minimum living standards. 
While progress was made on the compensation side, but the IED said, less evidence was found 
of governments providing livelihood support. 
“The stakes are too high for safeguard standards to slip at a time of rapidly unraveling 
development pressures across Asia; the response needs to be stronger safeguards not more 
flexible ones,” Taylor-Dormond said. 
The report examines the benefits and costs of implementing safeguards, an area that has 
received relatively little attention due to lack of data. 
 
Safeguarding policy for an infrastructure project in Georgia 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/821881468032948200/Georgia-Infrastructure-Pre-
investment-Facility-Project-safeguard-framework 
This paper summarises the approach to safeguards to be taken during the implementation of the 
project, which will include the preparation of appropriate environmental and social assessments 
for the follow-on investments. 
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10. Safeguarding nature becomes second nature 
http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2015-10/30/content_22313614.htm 
This is an interesting news article looking at how safeguarding has become more important in 
Chinese infrastructure projects. 
 
REACH- Improving water security for the poor 
http://reachwater.org.uk/research/a-risk-based-framework/ 
A conceptual framework for the 
research programme addresses the 
interactions between water security 
risks and poverty reduction across 
three intersecting 
dimensions: resource sustainability, 
inclusive services and sustainable 
growth. 
Achieving water security for the poor 
requires decision making across a 
wide range of choices, each with 
different outcomes.  
A risk-based framework is useful 
because it investigates the likelihood 
and consequences of harm, and 
enables us to study the trade-offs and 
outcomes of different decisions. We are interested in outcomes that influence water system 
sustainability, economic growth, or poverty reduction.   
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